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12

13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
14 **DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

15 Roy and Josie Fisher, et al.,  
16 Plaintiffs,  
17 v.  
18 United States of America,  
19 Plaintiff-Intervenors,  
20 v.  
21 Anita Lohr, et al.,  
22 Defendants,  
23 Sidney L. Sutton, et al.,  
24 Defendant-Intervenors,

Case No. 4:74-CV-00090-DCB

**MENDOZA PLAINTIFFS’  
OBJECTIONS TO ANALYSIS OF  
COMPLIANCE WITH UNITARY  
STATUS PLAN BY TUCSON UNIFIED  
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 [ECF 2075 –  
ECF 2075-10]**

Hon. David C. Bury

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27  
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1 Maria Mendoza, et al.,

Case No. CV 74-204 TUC DCB

2 Plaintiffs,

3 United States of America,

4 Plaintiff-Intervenor,

5 v.

6 Tucson United School District No. One, et  
al.,

7 Defendants.

8  
9  
10 **INTRODUCTION**

11 Under this Court’s May 17, 2017 Order (Doc. 2023), as clarified by its May 25,  
12 2017 and July 19, 2017 Orders (Docs. 2025 and 2037, respectively), the District filed the  
13 Analysis of Compliance with the Unitary Status Plan by Tucson Unified School District  
14 No. 1 (Docs. 2075 to 2075-10) (“USP Analysis”) on October 2, 2017.<sup>1</sup> Mendoza Plaintiffs  
15 file these objections to the District’s USP Analysis under the parties’ and Special Master’s  
16 agreement that the Plaintiffs may file objections to the District’s USP analysis no later than  
17 October 31, 2017. (*See* Exhibit 1.)

18 Mendoza Plaintiffs do not believe that at this stage in the process to which the  
19 parties agreed for addressing issues concerning whether the District will petition the Court  
20 for a finding of unitary status that it is appropriate to submit a point-by-point response to  
21

22 <sup>1</sup> While this Court contemplated that the District’s analysis relating to its progress in  
23 achieving unitary status would be filed as part of its Annual Report for the 2016-17 school  
24 year (*see* Docs. 2025 at 2:18-21 and 2037 at 2:3-9), the District filed its USP Analysis  
25 separate from its Annual Report for the 2016-17 school year, and described it as an annex  
26 to that annual report. (*See* Doc. 2057 (TUSD Annual Report for 2016-17 School Year  
27 filed on September 1, 2017).)

28 Additionally, on October 4, 2017, it filed a further “annex” to the 2016-17 Annual Report  
that in large part was an untimely response to Plaintiffs’ July 2017 objections (Docs. 2031  
and 2035) to the Special Master’s Annual Report (Doc. 2026) but that also set forth  
argument relating to the standards and analysis required in assessing the District’s progress  
toward unitary status, some of which therefore is addressed here. (*See* Doc. 2076-1  
 (“Annual Report Annex”).)

1 each assertion and all information included in the District’s USP Analysis. In any event,  
2 Mendoza Plaintiffs would need District responses to the information requests they  
3 submitted regarding the 2016-17 TUSD Annual Report, 40<sup>th</sup> day enrollment data for 2017-  
4 18, and additional time to be able to do so given the length (approximately 700 pages) and  
5 extreme granularity of the District’s submission.

6 Mendoza Plaintiffs can, however, comment on and object to glaring omissions from  
7 the District’s USP Analysis, including the absence of any discussion of the many instances  
8 in which the District took action to implement provisions of the USP only after the  
9 Plaintiffs or the Special Master intervened, which often required this Court’s assistance as  
10 well. Indeed, the many instances in which intervention was required raise serious  
11 questions about whether the District has demonstrated sufficient fidelity to the USP to be  
12 relieved of Court supervision. (*See Fisher v. Tucson Unified School District*, 652 F.3d  
13 1131, 1141, n.25 (9th Cir. 2011) (“one of the ***prerequisites to relinquishment of control...***  
14 *is that a school district has demonstrated its commitment to a course of action that gives*  
15 *full respect to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution*”) (citing *Freeman v.*  
16 *Pitts*, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992)); *see also id.* at 1143-44: “We...order [the court below] to  
17 maintain jurisdiction until it is satisfied that the School District has met its burden of  
18 *demonstrating* – not merely promising – its ‘good-faith compliance... with the [Settlement  
19 Agreement] over a reasonable period of time.’” (emphasis in original).)

20 Before turning to the significant omissions from the District’s USP Analysis,  
21 Mendoza Plaintiffs are constrained to address Section I of the USP Analysis, titled  
22 “Standards for Assessment and Compliance” (Doc. 2075-1), as it contains striking  
23 inaccuracies concerning the law of this case and the burden the District must meet to  
24 secure relief from court supervision.

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26 //

27 //

28

1 **ARGUMENT**

2 **The Ninth Circuit and This Court Have Clearly Held that TUSD Must Eliminate the**  
3 **Vestiges of Discrimination to the Extent Practicable with Respect to ALL Green**  
4 **Factors, and This Court Has Expressly and Repeatedly Rejected the District’s Effort**  
5 **to Argue for USP Compliance Without Addressing Program Effectiveness and**  
6 **Outcomes**

7 A. TUSD Must Eliminate the Vestiges of Discrimination to the Extent Practicable  
8 with Respect to ALL *Green* Factors

9 In the USP Analysis, the District again asserts that, in 1977, “the only vestige of the  
10 prior discrimination which Judge Frey found continued to exist as of the time of trial was  
11 in the racial and ethnic makeup of students at nine schools in the District,” and cites to a  
12 small part of the District Court’s August 21, 2007 Order (Doc. 1239) and the 1979 Order  
13 relating to student assignment to then assert that “there can be no vestiges of  
14 discrimination existing today which are causally linked to the de jure discrimination which  
15 is the foundation of this case”<sup>2</sup> and that, therefore, “the only issue properly remaining in  
16 this case .... [is its] ‘good faith.’” (USP Analysis, Section I (Doc. 2075-1) at 6-7 and 2.)

17 The District again is wrong. The law of this case, as established by both the Ninth  
18 Circuit and this Court, is clear: the District must demonstrate that it has eliminated the  
19 vestiges of discrimination to the extent practicable with regard to ALL *Green* factors. In  
20 2011, when the Ninth Circuit reversed this Court’s 2009 Order granting unitary status, it  
21 also ordered that the District Court maintain jurisdiction until it is “convinced that the  
22 District has eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination... to the extent practicable’ **with**  
23 **regard to all of the Green factors.**” *Fisher*, 652 F.3d at 1144 (*citing Freeman*, 503 U.S.  
24 at 492) (emphasis added). Further, when this Court adopted the USP, it rejected the very  
25 argument the District makes in the USP Analysis that “there can be no vestiges of

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>2</sup> Among the instances in which the District has recently raised this argument are in its  
28 March 7, 2017 Motion for Partial Unitary Status (*see* Doc. 1993 at 3-8) and Response to  
the Mendoza Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation  
Regarding Advanced Learning Experiences (*see* Doc. 2073 at 204).

1 discrimination existing today which are causally linked to the de jure discrimination which  
2 is the foundation of this case.” In its 2013 Order, the Court stated:

3  
4 According to the District, the only findings of fact and  
5 conclusions of law establishing the constitutional violation at  
6 issue in this case were those dated June 4, 1978... This is an  
7 old argument seen and rejected by this Court in 2006, when  
8 this Court issued the Order defining the scope of the unitary  
9 status proceeding... The Ninth Circuit’s ruling... established  
10 unequivocally that the District had not attained unitary status...  
11 [T]he Ninth Circuit reversed this Court’s finding that unitary  
12 status was attained and found the contrary because: [as argued  
13 by the Mendoza Plaintiffs,] the ‘District failed the good faith  
14 inquiry *and* [this Court’s findings] raised significant questions  
15 as to whether the District had eliminated the vestiges of racial  
16 discrimination to the extent practicable.’... **[I]t would be error  
17 for the Court to adopt the District’s assertion that certain  
18 Green factors are not at issue in this case now because they  
19 were not at issue in 1978... Given the express directive of  
20 the court of appeals that this Court, upon remand shall  
21 consider all of the Green factors... this Court finds them all  
22 at issue now.**

23 Doc. 1436 at 8:5-21; citations omitted; emphasis in italics in original; emphasis in bold  
24 added. As was true on February 6, 2013, when the Court issued the above referenced  
25 Order, it remains the case that “it would be error for the Court to [to now] adopt the  
26 District’s assertion” concerning the scope of its desegregation obligations.

27  
28 B. TUSD Must Implement Strategies Directed at Improving Outcomes, Including  
Analyzing Outcomes as Part of its Assessment of Program/Strategy  
Effectiveness under the USP

In its effort to avoid being held accountable for the outcomes of its desegregation  
efforts, the District has at various times asserted that it is not required to improve outcomes  
or use outcome data to guide its desegregation efforts, most notably with respect to student  
completion rates in Advanced Learning Experiences (“ALEs”).<sup>3</sup> Most recently, in the

<sup>3</sup> The District, for example, in responding to the Mendoza Plaintiffs’ objection to the  
failure of the Special Master’s R&R on ALEs to assess completion rates, attempted to

1 Annual Report Annex, the District again sought to avoid accountability relating to  
2 desegregation outcomes when it argued the following with respect to ALEs: “Good faith  
3 compliance with a desegregation decree focuses on the District’s actions and  
4 consequences, and *not [] outcomes or results...* participation and academic results [are an  
5 inappropriate] measurement of good faith... [P]erformance-related tests are not  
6 appropriate” in measuring progress toward unitary status. (Doc. 2076-1 at 29.)

7 TUSD’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Ninth Circuit and this Court  
8 have expressly rejected the District’s position, making clear that TUSD is obligated to  
9 focus on outcomes, in part through assessments of programs and strategies that analyze  
10 outcome data. For example, when the Ninth Circuit reversed this Court’s order awarding  
11 unitary status because the Court’s findings of fact failed to support that outcome, it wrote:  
12 “with regard to student achievement, the [district] court found that except for an analysis  
13 conducted in 1982, the District had ‘failed to review student achievement as a  
14 measurement for program effectiveness despite the fact that ‘ongoing review of program  
15 effectiveness is the only way to ensure that program changes address... quality of  
16 education for minority students.’”<sup>4</sup> *Fisher*, 652 F.3d at 1140, n.19.

17 This Court recently directly addressed and rejected the District’s argument, as it  
18 specifically related to ALEs, when it wrote: “The goal of the USP ALE provisions, USP §  
19 V, is for the District to implement strategies designed to increase participation by African  
20 American and Latino students in ALE programs. The USP calls for the design,  
21 implementation, and ongoing operation, ***which necessarily includes review and revision***  
22 ***when warranted, of strategies to increase access, participation, and completion by***  
23

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24 equate “participation” in ALEs with student “completion” of ALEs rather than address  
25 actual success in and completion of the District’s ALE offerings. (Doc. 2073 at 12.)

26 <sup>4</sup> Other bases for the Ninth Circuit’s reversal were that the “District had failed to make ‘the  
27 most basic inquiries necessary to assess the ongoing effectiveness of its student assignment  
28 plans;’ had ‘exacerbated the inequities’ of racial imbalances through its ‘failure to assess  
program effectiveness;’ ... had never ‘undertaken a comprehensive analysis of suspension  
and expulsion data by ethnicity and race;’ ... and had failed to review program  
effectiveness in order to ensure quality education for minority students.” (*Id.* at 1142.)

1 *African American and Latino students in ALE programs.*” (Doc. 2084 at 17:2-10;  
 2 emphasis added) This Court further affirmed the District’s legal obligations relating to  
 3 program efficacy assessments, outcomes and ALE completion rates when it struck the  
 4 ALE section of the USP Analysis (*id.* at 19: 4-6) and stated that it “defines participation as  
 5 the number of students enrolled in ALE courses and **includes completion**, defined as the  
 6 number of students passing ALE courses and number of students taking and passing  
 7 requisite certification tests necessary for African American and Latino students to secure  
 8 the benefit of participating in ALE programs.” (*Id.* at 17:17-21; emphasis added.)

9 **Significant Omissions from the District’s USP Analysis Demonstrate that, with**  
 10 **Respect to Whether TUSD Has Met the Prerequisite to Relinquishment of Court**  
 11 **Oversight by Demonstrating its Good-Faith Commitment to the Whole of the USP,**  
 12 **TUSD Has Repeatedly Failed to Faithfully Implement the USP on Its Own Such that**  
 13 **There Has Been an Ongoing Need for Court Intervention and Special Master**  
 14 **Oversight, Indicating that Withdrawal of Judicial Supervision is Not Yet Warranted**

15 In *Freeman*, the Supreme Court made clear that “*one of the prerequisites to*  
 16 *relinquishment of control in whole or in part is that a school district has demonstrated its*  
 17 *commitment to a course of action that gives full respect to the equal protection guarantees*  
 18 *of the Constitution.*” (503 U.S. at 490.) Indeed, the purpose of this prerequisite is to  
 19 “demonstrate[], to the public and to the parents and students of the once disfavored race,  
 20 its good-faith commitment to the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions of the  
 21 law and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first  
 22 instance.” (*Id.* at 491.) Further, a “school system is better positioned to demonstrate its  
 23 good-faith commitment to a constitutional course of action when its *policies form a*  
 24 *consistent pattern of lawful conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations.*” (*Id.*)

25 As shown below, the District has, through the life of the USP, consistently failed to  
 26 adequately implement various components of the USP such that Plaintiff and Special  
 27 Master intervention, often with Court assistance, was required to secure District  
 28



1 implementation.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, these issues, together with ongoing issues concerning Plaintiff  
2 and Special Master access to data sufficient to make informed comment, and inadequacies  
3 in District compliance with notice and request for approval procedures set forth in the  
4 USP, show that the District is not yet at a point that it can be trusted to “do the right thing”  
5 in the absence of judicial supervision.<sup>6</sup>

6  
7 A. Culturally Relevant Courses (“CRCs”)

8 With respect to both the expansion of CRCs and fidelity to the Itinerant Teacher  
9 Model of the CRC Intervention Plan, Plaintiff and Special Master action was required to  
10 ensure District compliance with the CRC provisions of the USP and the stipulated CRC  
11 Intervention Plan.

12 1. Expansion of CRCs

13 A key USP strategy to “increase academic achievement and engagement among  
14 African American and Latino students” is the “develop[ment] and implement[ion including  
15 as core English and Social Studies classes in all high schools in the District, of] culturally  
16 relevant courses of instruction designed to reflect the history, experiences, and culture of  
17 African American and Mexican American communities” and to expand such courses  
18 initially to the sixth through eighth grades and then throughout the K-12 curriculum.  
19 (USP, V,E,6,a,ii.)

20 During the summer of 2014, after determining that TUSD had failed to implement  
21 the CRC provisions of the USP requiring expansion of the courses, Mendoza Plaintiffs  
22 asked the Special Master to bring this instance of USP noncompliance to the Court’s  
23 attention under USP Section X, E, 6. Thereafter, he did so. (Doc. 1700.) To obviate the  
24

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25 <sup>5</sup> Mendoza Plaintiffs do not catalogue all such instances but, rather, provide a  
26 representative set of examples.

27 <sup>6</sup> As Mendoza Plaintiffs stated in their opposition to the District’s motion for partial  
28 unitary status, they are encouraged by recent changes in District governance and  
administration and are hopeful that, going forward, the District will be able to demonstrate  
the required commitment.



1 need for further court proceedings, Mendoza Plaintiffs and TUSD entered into a stipulation  
2 pursuant to which the District adopted an Intervention Plan to remediate then existing  
3 areas of noncompliance and to expressly address CRC expansion through the 2017-18  
4 school year. (Doc. 1761 (“CRC Intervention Plan”); so ordered by the Court by Order  
5 dated 2/12/15, Doc. 1768.)

## 6 2. Itinerant Teacher Model of CRC Intervention Plan

7 Following the development of the CRC Intervention Plan, there were disagreements  
8 between the parties concerning the District’s implementation of the Plan. Notwithstanding  
9 the fact that the Special Master and the Court subsequently declined to hold the District  
10 noncompliant, this Court also expressly directed that “the Special Master should monitor  
11 the Intervention Plan **to ensure** the District continues its efforts to implement and expand  
12 the CRC program.” (Order dated 12/17/16, Doc. No. 1982, at 2:15-17; emphasis added.)

13 Further, with respect to the explicit requirement in the Plan that the District assign  
14 12 Itinerant Teachers to, *inter alia*, provide effective CRC teacher support regarding CRC  
15 instruction, develop CRC curriculum, and recruit students to the classes (a requirement  
16 with which both the Special Master and the Court found the District had failed to comply),  
17 this Court wrote:

18  
19 Like the Mendoza Plaintiffs, the Court is concerned that the  
20 reduction in itinerant staff may correspond to a reduction in  
21 their duties and, correspondingly, a dilution of the planned  
22 intensity of the Itinerant Teacher Model....The Court is not  
23 prepared to say that six versus 12 is enough. The Special  
24 Master notes that TUSD offers no program-based rationale for  
25 estimating that it needs one itinerant teacher for every ten CRC  
26 teachers....Assuming there was a rational basis for the original  
27 estimate that the program needed 12 itinerant teachers and the  
28 large unexplained disparity between that planned number of  
itinerant teachers and the actual number hired, the **Court finds  
that monitoring is warranted.** The Special Master shall  
review the District’s use of itinerant staff to ensure full  
compliance with the Intervention Plan’s Itinerant Teacher  
Model.

1 Doc. 1982 at 3:18-4:4; emphasis added. The Court reaffirmed its intent that the District’s  
2 actions be carefully monitored when it then “ORDERED that the Special Master shall  
3 review the District’s use of itinerant staff to ensure full compliance with the Intervention  
4 Plan’s Itinerant Teacher Model” (*id.* at 4:20-22) and “FURTHER ORDERED that TUSD  
5 shall develop a meaningful itinerant teacher-CRC teacher ratio sufficient to meet the needs  
6 of the Itinerant Teacher Model agreed to by the parties pursuant to the stipulated  
7 Intervention Plan, and this ratio shall be developed and used for the 2017-18 USP budget.  
8 The Special Master shall develop a data gathering and review plan, both substantive and  
9 procedural, to monitor the effectiveness of TUSD’s itinerant teacher-CRC teacher ratio for  
10 use in the 2016-17 Special Master’s Annual Report (SMAR).” (*Id.* at 4:23-5:2.)

#### 11 B. Expansion of Dual Language Programs

12 The USP recognizes that “Dual Language programs are positive and academically  
13 rigorous programs designed to contribute significantly to the academic achievement of all  
14 students who participate in them” (USP, V, C.) Accordingly, it provides that the District  
15 “shall build and expand its Dual Language programs in order to provide more students  
16 throughout the District with opportunities to enroll in these programs.” (*Id.*)

17 The District’s failure to implement that clear directive was succinctly described and  
18 addressed in this Court’s January 28, 2016 budget order when it wrote:

19  
20 Again, the Mendoza Plaintiffs express concern that the  
21 District failed to use 910(G) funding to expand the dual  
22 language program. Last year, the Mendoza Plaintiffs  
23 challenged proposed expenditures for dual language teachers  
24 on supplant vs. supplement grounds, and noted that the  
25 District must “build and expand the Dual Language Programs  
26 in order to provide more students throughout the District with  
27 opportunities to enroll in these programs.” Still this year, the  
28 District fails to budget 901(G) money to expand dual language  
programs, “in fact, the number of schools offering dual  
language programs and overall enrollment in the programs has  
substantially declined.” (citing Mendoza Plaintiffs’  
Objections, Doc. 1833, Ex. B.) Suffice it to say: “If not now,  
when?” ....

1 The Court adopts the Special Master’s recommendation that  
2 the District be required to develop a plan for increasing the  
3 student access to dual language programs which must be  
4 implemented in 2016-17. Given the delay in moving forward  
5 with the dual language component of the USP, the District  
6 should engage one or more nationally recognized consultants  
7 to assist in studying and developing the plan, which must be  
8 prepared and presented to the parties and the Special Master  
9 for review and comment in a timely fashion for implementation  
10 in SY 2016-17.

11 Order dated 1/28/16, Doc. 1897, at 6:10-7:2; some citations omitted.

12 C. Student Assignment

13 1. Magnet Schools

14 The USP provides that the “District shall continue to implement magnet schools and  
15 programs as a strategy for assigning students to schools and to provide students with the  
16 opportunity to attend an integrated school.” (USP, II, E, 1.) Under the USP, by April 1,  
17 2013, the District was to have developed a Magnet Plan that, *inter alia*, would improve  
18 existing magnet schools and programs that were not promoting integration and/or  
19 educational quality, consider changes to schools that were not promoting integration and/or  
20 educational quality, include strategies to specifically engage African American and Latino  
21 families, including the families of English language learner students, and identify goals to  
22 further the integration of each magnet school. (USP, II, E, 3.)

23 As this Court has observed, the Magnet Plan is “the USP’s key component for  
24 integration.” (Order dated 1/16/15, Doc. 1753, at 12:4-5.) The Magnet Plan therefore has  
25 received a great deal of attention from the Plaintiffs, the Special Master, and this Court.  
26 For example, in its Order dated 1/16/15, the Court recited relevant case history relating to  
27 the preparation of a Magnet Plan, focusing on the Comprehensive Magnet Plan (“CMP”)  
28 adopted by the Governing Board in July 2014 and a subsequent, Revised CMP, modified  
to address certain objections raised by the Special Master and the Plaintiffs with respect to  
the July CMP. This Court then wrote: “The Court...cannot approve the CMP, adopted by  
the School Board on July 15, 2014, or the Revised CMP. Neither is a comprehensive plan  
as required by the USP....In short, the CMP fails to reflect the District’s vision for a

1 meaningful operational Magnet School Plan, [which] it can support long term.” (Doc.  
2 1753 at 16:1-13.) This Court then added:

3  
4 [T]he CMP fails to identify the specific activities which must  
5 be undertaken by each school to attain magnet status. There is  
6 no budgetary assessment as to how much money it will take to  
7 make the requisite improvements or [even] how many schools  
8 it can maintain as magnets long term. There is no  
9 transportation component in the CMP, which is the most  
10 expensive factor in operating a magnet school system. School  
11 boundaries have not been factored into the plan. The CMP  
12 speaks to developing Improvement Plans, but until detailed  
13 plans, complete with budget and resource estimates, are  
14 prepared for a school, it is impossible to ascertain what actions,  
15 if any, a school can undertake to attain true magnet status by  
16 the USP target date for attaining unitary status: SY 2016-17.

11 Doc. 1753 at 13-22. The Court then directed as follows:

13 The District, in consultation with the Special Master, shall  
14 work with its schools to prepare the Improvement Plans over  
15 the next three months, which shall identify clear and specific  
16 annual bench marks for attaining magnet status by SY 2016-  
17 17. **The Special Master shall monitor compliance by each  
18 school regarding its Improvement Plan.** The Special Master  
19 shall file reports as necessary with the Court identifying any  
20 failure to attain a requisite benchmark....

18 The Special Master, in consultation with TUSD, shall...  
19 prepare a logical schedule for data gathering and reporting by  
20 TUSD necessary to enable him to monitor the Implementation  
21 Plans and report to the Court. In four months, TUSD shall file  
22 a Revised CMP, which will be a comprehensive gathering  
23 together of the relevant information, including the  
24 Improvement Plans. The CMP should be a one-stop, road map  
25 for future review by the Parties, the Special Master, the TUSD  
26 schools, this Court, and the public.

23 *Id.* at 17:17-18:6; emphasis added. In June 2015, TUSD filed a Revised CMP with the  
24 Court. Thereafter, having received objections from the Plaintiffs, the Special Master  
25 worked with the parties to address the Plaintiffs’ concerns and filed an R&R with the  
26 Court, recommending approval of the Revised CMP, with certain additional changes to  
27 which TUSD agreed.

1 Separately, in connection with a stipulation TUSD and the Mendoza Plaintiffs filed  
2 seeking an extension from the Court of time for it to take action on the Special Master's  
3 recommendations to have magnet status withdrawn from certain magnet schools or  
4 programs,<sup>7</sup> Mendoza Plaintiffs had insisted on inclusion of a provision requiring the  
5 District to "develop and propose initiatives to increase the number of students attending  
6 integrated schools" in TUSD given their belief that the District had inadequately moved  
7 this USP priority forward.<sup>8</sup> In an Order addressing both the Revised CMP and the  
8 stipulation concerning magnet schools,<sup>9</sup> the Court approved the Revised CMP inclusive of  
9 the changes agreed to by the District. (Order dated 11/19/15, Doc. 1870.) Significantly,  
10 the Court also "s[ought] to **ensure** [that the stipulation provision concerning development  
11 and implementation of integrative initiatives] does not reproduce a generalized discussion  
12 of initiatives, which is already contained in the CMP" (*id.* at 8:1-4; emphasis added), and  
13 therefore clarified that as part of that provision, TUSD must "research and propose  
14 alternative, more integrative, magnet themes or programs and to assist the schools in  
15 assessing the strength of their existing magnet programs and themes in comparison to any  
16 stronger more integrative programs" (*id.* at 10:16-19).<sup>10</sup> However, the Court's Order of

---

17 <sup>7</sup> Mendoza Plaintiffs do not here detail the case history relating to the Special Master's  
18 recommendations concerning withdrawal of magnet status or of the development of the  
19 stipulation filed with the Court, but note that the stipulation included "very specific  
20 undertakings by TUSD to ensure the magnet schools and programs receive the resources  
they require to implement their Improvement Plans." (Order dated 11/19/15, Doc. 1870 at  
3:4-6)

21 <sup>8</sup> While the Mendoza Plaintiffs understand the District does not agree with the basis  
22 underlying their having sought to include a provision concerning District integrative  
23 initiatives in the Magnet Stipulation, the District did agree to include such a provision in  
the stipulation filed with the Court.

24 <sup>9</sup> TUSD and the Mendoza Plaintiffs filed a stipulation for Court approval on October 23,  
2015, which was supplanted on November 6, 2015 by a Second Stipulation Regarding  
25 Magnet School Enrollment Data and Magnet School Supplemented Improvement Plan  
(Doc. 1865) ("Magnet Stipulation") that took into account student enrollment at the  
magnet schools on the 40th day of the 2015-16 school year. (*See* Doc. 1870 at 2:25-3:2.)

26 <sup>10</sup> The District subsequently moved the Court for reconsideration of its clarification of the  
27 magnet stipulation provision calling for development and implementation of integration  
28 initiatives, in which Mendoza Plaintiffs joined, mistakenly believing the Court may have  
misread that provision as specifically relating to magnet schools and programs, rather than  
as contemplating District-wide integrative initiatives as was intended. The Court

1 November 19, 2015 did not eliminate the need for further Special Master and Court  
2 engagement with the Magnet Plan.

3 The District updated the magnet schools' Improvement Plans as part of the 2016-17  
4 budget process. As they had the prior year, Mendoza Plaintiffs commented on the  
5 substance of the plans in the context of their budget review. Here, they focus on only one  
6 issue: magnet school goals for academic achievement.<sup>11</sup>

7 During the 2015-16 budget cycle, Mendoza Plaintiffs had objected to the fact that  
8 three magnet schools set achievement goals in their Improvement Plans that were lower  
9 than what the schools previously had achieved. In the face of that objection, the District  
10 agreed to revise the school goals. Then, in the 2016-17 budget cycle, it filed Improvement  
11 Plans in which **five** magnet schools set goals that were lower than what the schools  
12 previously had achieved. Again, Mendoza Plaintiffs objected. (*See*, Doc. 1948-13 at 4-5  
13 for a recitation of this history.) In his R&R on the 2016-17 budget, the Special Master  
14 wrote: "While not a funding matter, the District was previously not allowed to ascribe  
15 academic goals for magnet schools that were lower than the goals they already had  
16 attained. That the District permitted this for 2016-17 is unacceptable and sends a bizarre  
17 message to families, staff and students: 'we are satisfied to do less this year than we have  
18 in the past.'" (Doc. 1954 at 7:8-11.) This Court rejected TUSD's assertion that no order  
19 was needed because, after the R&R had been filed, it had agreed to this and other of the  
20 Special Master's recommendations, and expressly adopted the Special Master's  
21 recommendations in its Order. (Doc. 1981 at 2:12; 10:4-6.)

22  
23  
24 subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration request, explaining that its clarification  
25 did not preclude the type of District-wide integrative initiatives that had been intended,  
26 but, rather, that the Court's Order was requiring "the District to consider, within the  
27 context of these initiatives, the integrative strength of various magnet strategies." (Order  
28 dated 12/11/15, Doc. 1878, at 4:4-9.)

<sup>11</sup> This Court has stressed the importance of high academic standards in magnet schools,  
writing, for example: "[H]igh academic standards will draw students to a magnet school,  
and an effective magnet program will improve student achievement." (Doc. 1753 at  
10:11-12.)



1 Notwithstanding the many challenges being faced by the District’s magnet schools  
 2 and the overall magnet program, during the 2016-17 budget cycle the District proposed to  
 3 staff the position of Magnet Director “on a half-time basis” and to fill the position with  
 4 someone who had “no experience with magnet schools.” (Special Master R&R, Doc.  
 5 1954, at 6:18.) (The other responsibility proposed to be assigned to this position was to  
 6 serve as Coordinator of Advanced Learning Experiences.<sup>12</sup>) Only after the Special Master  
 7 had filed his R&R did the District say that it would fund two full positions. The Court  
 8 observed: “The Court notes the eleventh-hour agreement from TUSD and that TUSD’s  
 9 plan to have a single person serve as Magnet Director and ALE Coordinator means that  
 10 these two very important administrative positions remain understaffed and/or unfilled  
 11 approximately five years after the adoption in SY 2012-2013 of the USP. Like the CMP,  
 12 the ALE...component to the USP is critical to its success because it is a key mechanism  
 13 for ensuring equal educational opportunities to all students in the District.”

14 2. Grade Reconfigurations: Failure to Follow USP Section II, D, 2  
 15 Procedures Directed at Advancing Integration or Review and  
 16 Comment Procedures

17 USP Section II, D, 2 requires that whenever the District seeks to undertake any of a  
 18 list of enumerated actions that involve drawing of attendance boundaries, it must “consider  
 19 the following criteria: (i) current and projected enrollment; (ii) capacity; (iii) compactness  
 20 of the attendance area; (iv) physical barriers; (v) demographics (i.e., race, ethnicity, growth  
 21 projections, socioeconomic status); and (vi) effects on school integration. In applying  
 22 these criteria, the *District shall propose and evaluate various scenarios with, at minimum,*  
 23 *the Plaintiffs and the Special Master, in an effort to increase the integration of its*  
 24 *schools.”* (USP Section II, D, 2; emphasis added.)

25 In April 2015, the TUSD sought Court approval of plans to add a 6<sup>th</sup> grade at  
 26 Fruchthendler Elementary School, to add 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> grades at Sabino High School, and to

27 <sup>12</sup> The USP provides that the District is to hire or designate a District employee to be the  
 28 Coordinator of ALEs. ALEs include Gifted and Talented (“GATE”) programs, Advanced  
 Academic Courses (“AACs”) [Pre-AP courses, AP courses, middle school courses for high  
 school credit, AP courses, Dual-Credit courses, and I.B. courses]. (USP V, A, 2, a.)



1 create an “Honors pipeline” at these schools. (*See* Order dated 5/12/17, Doc. 1799, at 2:4-  
2 6.) In rejecting the District’s proposal, this Court noted that the “record reflects that the  
3 student assignments proposed by TUSD were not considered in the context of the four  
4 integration strategies required by the USP [under Section II, D, 2]” and that the District  
5 was not exempted from this required USP “effort to increase the integration of TUSD  
6 schools.” (*Id.* at 5:11-20.) The Court further detailed the District’s failure to consider  
7 “how the [proposed] Fruchthendler-Sabino Honors Pipeline plan fits into these plans and  
8 strategies, and if not, why.” (*Id.* at 5:20-24.)

9 With respect to Plaintiff and Special Master review and comment, the Court noted  
10 the Plaintiffs’ and Special Master’s “complain[t] that TUSD fast-tracked these changes  
11 without involving them or the Boundary Change Committee [that then was considering  
12 boundary proposals] in discussion,” and stated that the fact that the procedure was a  
13 NARA<sup>13</sup> request “do[es] not, however, create some lesser review and input requirements  
14 for the Plaintiffs and Special Master than they hold pursuant to the USP [Section] I.D.1 in  
15 respect to changes affecting school attendance.” (*Id.* at 3:4-14.)

16 Significantly, in addressing the USP Section II, D, 2 requirements with which  
17 TUSD had failed to comply the Court referenced its April 26, 2013 Order (of two years  
18 earlier), concerning Boundaries for Schools Closing and Receiving Schools in which it  
19 detailed the District’s then failure to comply with USP Section II, D, 2. (*See* Order dated  
20 4/26/13 at 4-5.) That Order had similarly concerned issues relating to the District’s  
21 compliance with review and comment procedures. (*See id.* at 3:1-6 ([T]his is the *third*  
22 time [the Court] has been asked to approve some action by the District, which requires  
23 review and comment from the Special Master and the Plaintiffs, where the process for  
24 review adhered to by the District has resulted in this Court deciding a question without  
25 adequate review from the Plaintiffs and Special Master... the District ignores the Court’s  
26 frustration with this reoccurring problem.”).

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27  
28 <sup>13</sup> The NARA process is further described below in the following subsection.

1 3. Grade Reconfigurations: Failure to Propose Changes That Would  
2 Advance Integration

3 Under the Order Appointing Special Master, the District must provide the Special  
4 Master and the Plaintiffs with notice and request for approval (“NARA”) of all attendance  
5 boundary changes and changes to student assignment patterns. (Order dated 1/6/12, Doc.  
6 1350, at 3:8-15) All such requests are to be accompanied by a desegregation impact  
7 analysis.

8 Most recently, in March 2016, this Court denied the District’s NARA request to  
9 change the grade configuration of Borman Elementary School (as well as those relating to  
10 Collier and Fruchthendler Elementary Schools and Sabino High School, as discussed  
11 below) because the District could not demonstrate that the proposed changes would  
12 advance the integration of the District’s schools.

13 Addressing the request to add 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> grade levels to Borman, this Court first  
14 noted that it had seen (and rejected) a comparable request in 2007 when it denied the  
15 District’s application to reopen Lowell Smith Elementary School on the Davis-Montham  
16 Air Force Base (“DMAFB”) as a middle school. (Order dated 3/8/16, Doc. 1909, at 3:22-  
17 18; amended by Order dated 4/28/16, Doc. 1928.) The Court further noted that at the time  
18 of the 2007 proposal, as was true with respect to the reconfiguration proposal then before  
19 the Court, Roberts-Naylor, the K-8 school serving DMAFB, had an enrollment that was  
20 80% minority and was low achieving academically. (*Id.* at 3:22-4:15.) Responding to the  
21 District’s assertion that its proposal should be approved because it “will not change  
22 anything; it neither improves nor exacerbates ethnic imbalances” (*id.* at 4:15-17), the Court  
23 stated:

24 The USP requires more than just doing no harm; it requires  
25 TUSD to take affirmative actions to do good in the context of  
26 improving integration and the quality of education for minority  
27 students, if it can.... Roberts-Naylor is a [predominately  
28 minority] school uniquely situated adjacent to DMAFB, an  
unusual source of Anglo students, which could affirmatively  
impact integration at Roberts-Naylor if they could be directed  
there. Until the Court is certain that Roberts-Naylor cannot be  
a viable K-8 program for Borman students, it will not approve

1 a plan which will ensure that Roberts-Naylor can never be such  
an alternative.<sup>14</sup>

2 *Id.* at 5:28-6:8.

3 The Court therefore denied the District's request to reconfigure Borman K-5 into a  
4 K-8 school. Further, in express recognition that improved academic achievement at  
5 Roberts-Naylor could make it an attractive school to DMAFB students to potentially move  
6 Roberts-Naylor toward achieving integration and given the District's apparent failure to  
7 have considered how to do so, the Court ordered the District to within 30 days "prepare a  
8 detailed report regarding the academic achievement and demographic conditions at  
9 Roberts-Naylor and describe the measures, if any, which have been or could be taken by  
10 TUSD to transform Roberts-Naylor into a viable K-8 program capable of competing with  
11 the middle schools now attracting Borman students. TUSD should explain why or why  
12 not it is feasible to implement any such identified measures. TUSD should consider a  
13 timeline to accomplish a transformation at Roberts-Naylor sufficient to begin attracting  
14 students that currently choose elsewhere." (*Id.* at 17:10-23.)

#### 15 4. Grade Reconfiguration Proposals: Magee Attractiveness for 16 Integrative Purposes

17 In the Court's March 8, 2016 Order, the Court also addressed the District's proposal  
18 to reconfigure the Fruchthendler and Collier elementary schools from K-5 to K-6, with a  
19 middle school component added at Sabino High School. In reference to an identical  
20 proposal submitted by the District in April 2015, the Court stated that "[t]hen as now  
21 TUSD admitted [the proposal] would draw Anglo students away from Magee, but [it  
22 asserts] that Magee had a sufficient Anglo student population to withstand the loss of white  
23 students." (*Id.* at 7:5-7.) The Court then addressed the fact that no evidence was presented  
24

25 <sup>14</sup> The District's reconfiguration proposals and this Court's analysis are particularly  
26 relevant to the assessment of its good faith. As the Supreme Court wrote in *Green v. Co.*  
27 *School Bd. of New Kent Co.*, 391 U.S. 420, 439 (1968): "The obligation of the district  
28 courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving  
desegregation....Of course, the availability to the [school] board of other more promising  
courses of action may indicate a lack of good faith, and, at the least, it places a heavy  
burden upon the board to explain its preference for an apparently less effective method."

1 showing that the primarily white students not then attending TUSD schools who might be  
2 attracted to attend Fruchthendler, Collier, or Sabino under the District’s proposal would  
3 help integration efforts and stated that “the intent [of the proposal] is contrary: TUSD  
4 intends that these students will attend Fruchthendler, Collier, and Sabino... There will be  
5 no new pool of potential attendees for the purpose of integrating any other TUSD schools.”  
6 (*Id.* at 13:3-7.)

7 Moreover, in addressing the District’s proposal, including the “mitigation”  
8 measures of adding express bussing and ALE programs at Magee to combat the loss of  
9 primarily white students that Magee was expected to experience under the proposal, which  
10 would in turn negatively affect Magee’s academic achievement and attractiveness, the  
11 Court said the following:

12  
13 Is this enough? No... Embarking on this plan closes the door for  
14 Magee Middle School or any other existing TUSD school, with  
15 higher percentages of minority students than Sabino, to be the  
16 subject of a plan to attract Anglo students currently not attending  
17 TUSD schools... The Court cannot find any positive impact on  
18 integration from the reconfiguration... [proposed, which] simply  
19 provides more opportunities to Anglo students in predominantly  
20 Anglo schools. As the Fisher Plaintiffs note: if White-flight is a  
factor in the resistance by Anglo students to travel south in the  
TUSD district [to schools with higher concentrations of racial  
minorities], TUSD should reconsider a plan that would facilitate  
White-flight.

21 *Id.* at 15:22-16:27. Further, consistent with the Court’s direction that “TUSD should  
22 consider whether the possibility exists for Magee Middle School or any other TUSD  
23 school to become an attractive option” in order to increase integration (*id.* at 16:-10), the  
24 Court “approve[d] the NARA in respect to TUSD’s plan to add express bussing and the  
25 AVID and AP programs at Magee Middle School and... [ALEs] such as GATE and pre-  
26 AP classes” (*id.* at 17:24-18:3). Significantly, the Court approved these measures directed  
27 at creating pro-integrative initiatives notwithstanding that it rejected the District’s  
28

1 reconfiguration proposal of which the Magee express bussing and ALE introduction plans  
2 were a part. (*Id.*)

3  
4 D. Diversity of Certificated Staff

5 Under USP Section IV, E, 2, the District is required to “identify significant  
6 disparities (*i.e.*, more than a 15 percentage point variance) between the percentage of  
7 African American or Latino certificated staff or administrators at an individual school and  
8 district-wide percentages for schools at the comparable grade level,” and the USP  
9 expressly contemplates “reassign[ment of] personnel between schools” as one strategy to  
10 address those disparities (USP Section IV, E, 3). Having noted that this was an area in  
11 which the “District is out of compliance with the USP” and that “[t]here does not appear to  
12 be a plan for resolving this problem” in his annual report for the 2014-15 school year (Doc.  
13 1890), the Special Master, on March 23, 2016, recommended that the Court “*direct the*  
14 *District to immediately develop and implement a plan* to reduce by half by the beginning  
15 of the 2016-17 school year the number of schools in which there are existing racial  
16 disparities, as defined by the USP, among the teaching staffs” particularly because the  
17 related USP provisions were “intended to implement one of the key standards established  
18 by the Supreme Court in [the] *Green*” case “to determine whether a school district has met  
19 its obligations under the Constitution of the United States to remedy the vestiges of  
20 discrimination.” (Doc. 1913 at 2:7-11; 3:2-6; emphasis added.)

21 On March 28, 2016, the Court agreed and adopted the Special Master’s  
22 recommendation, ordering that the District shall develop and implement a plan to address  
23 this USP requirement. (Order dated 3/28/16, Doc. 1914, at 2:4-8.) Thus, it was over three  
24 years after the USP was adopted and only after the Court issued its March 28, 2016 Order,  
25 that the District developed specific strategies to address this USP requirement. (*See, e.g.*,  
26 Special Master’s Annual Report for the 2015-16 school year (Doc. 2026) at 8:14-16.  
27 (“Until 2016, the District did not have a specific plan for achieving this [USP] goal.”).)  
28

1 E. Advanced Learning Experiences

2 Recently, in the Mendoza Plaintiffs' objection to the Special Master's report and  
3 recommendation concerning ALEs (Doc. 2041), in which the Mendoza Plaintiffs called  
4 attention to the growing ALE participation gaps between TUSD's Latino and African  
5 American students on one hand, and white students on the other, the Mendoza Plaintiffs  
6 addressed the absence of information in the report on white student participation in ALEs  
7 as required to adequately assess the District's efforts to "ensure that African American and  
8 Latino Students have equal access to the District's" ALEs under USP Section V, A, 1.  
9 (Doc. 2069 at 2-4.) In its response to the Mendoza Plaintiffs' objection, the District went  
10 so far as to assert that "the District does **not** 'operate[] under a mandate to increase the  
11 relative participation of the Latino and African American students in ALEs in the  
12 District.'" (Doc. 2073 at 7:1-3; emphasis in original.)

13 Further, the District responded to the Mendoza Plaintiffs' argument that the Special  
14 Master's report and recommendation insufficiently addressed ALE completion rates with  
15 an odd argument premised on equating ALE "participation" with ALE "completion" to  
16 then assert that because the Special Master addressed "participation" rates, he did indeed  
17 address "completion" rates. (*See Id.* at 12.)

18 In rejecting the District's argument and reinforcing the USP's equal ALE access  
19 provisions, this Court stated that "[w]hat is relevant is whether the District has simply  
20 increased access to ALEs or has *increased access to ALEs for minority students... [I]t is*  
21 *the latter which is required under the USP.* Without comparative data for White students,  
22 the District runs the risk of increasing White student participation at the expense of African  
23 American and Latino students. The Court rejects the District's objection to providing  
24 comparative data [sic] for White students." (Order dated 10/24/17, Doc. 2084, at 9:16-22;  
25 emphasis added.) The Court further rejected the District's argument seeking to avoid  
26 analysis of completion rates when it agreed with the Special Master that the USP required  
27 goals to increase participation *and completion* rates in ALEs, stating that this was "in  
28

1 accordance with the USP provisions contained in § V,” including sections, 1, 2.a, 2.b, 2.c,  
 2 2.d, and 2.v. (*Id.* at 4:4:13-5:5.) Moreover, the Court seemingly rejected the District’s  
 3 odd attempt to equate ALE “participation” with ALE “completion” by expressly defining  
 4 each of those terms in its Order. (*Id.* at 17:16-21.).

5 Significantly, given the centrality of analyzing relative participation rates in  
 6 assessing equal ALE access for African American and Latino students, as well as African  
 7 American and Latino student ALE completion rates (among other things), to measure the  
 8 District’s progress toward unitary status in this area, the Court “**ORDERED STRIKING**  
 9 the ALE section in” the District’s USP Analysis, and “**FURTHER ORDERED** that  
 10 within 60 days of the filing date of [the] Order, the District shall file a Revised ALE  
 11 section” to the USP Analysis that is in accordance with the Court’s Order.<sup>15</sup> (*Id.* at 19:4-  
 12 10.)

#### 13 F. Discipline

14 Addressing the Special Master’s recommendation that, pursuant to USP VI, F, 3,  
 15 TUSD develop a viable plan for identifying and sharing effective disciplinary practices and  
 16 finance that plan, in an Order dated December 27, 2016, the Court wrote:

17  
 18 The Special Master notes ‘that disciplinary problems in TUSD  
 19 receive considerable negative attention in the community and  
 20 generate concerns among teachers and principals, [yet] the  
 21 District has not taken this provision of the USP seriously.’ The  
 22 Court notes that since the 1974 inception of this case, TUSD  
 23 has failed to takes its disciplinary practices and procedures  
 seriously. Discipline was one of the *Green*-factor challenges  
 raised by the Plaintiff Fishers and remedied by the Settlement  
 Agreement of 1978, paragraph 14, which required TUSD to  
 implement good faith efforts that no student is discriminated

24 <sup>15</sup> The Court further adopted many of the Special Master’s recommendations “calling for  
 25 immediate action by the District to increase access to ALE programs” (*id.* at 16) that relate  
 26 to GATE testing, ALE marketing, increasing GATE-certified teachers at TUSD, ALE  
 27 expansion and access disparities, and AP testing, among other things (*id.* at 18:11-23). Of  
 28 these ordered “immediate actions,” most notable is the Court’s “ORDER[] that the District  
 shall open cluster Pullout GATE programs to at least the 2013-14 level [of 14, up from the  
 current level of three] and place them strategically at schools serving minority students,  
 and especially target them at schools serving substantial numbers of African American  
 students.” (*Id.* at 18:24-27.)



1 against in the implementation of the District’s uniform  
2 suspension and expulsion policy. In 2008, when this Court  
3 considered whether unitary status had been attained after  
4 approximately 30 years of operations pursuant to the 1978  
5 Settlement Agreement, it questioned whether paragraph 14 had  
6 been addressed in good faith because there was no evidence of  
7 any ongoing monitoring and review of TUSD’s disciplinary  
8 practices and policies to ensure the District maintained over all  
9 those years a uniform suspension and expulsion policy and no  
10 student was discriminated against.

11 This Court, therefore, does not take lightly the Special Master’s  
12 concern that \$25,000 in the 2017 budget fails to move TUSD  
13 forward in respect to satisfying the USP § VI, F, 3 disciplinary  
14 provision to identify and share successful practices....TUSD  
15 agreed to this, but the Court notes that the Special Master made  
16 this recommendation to TUSD in his 2014-2015 Annual  
17 Report to the Court.

18 Doc. 1981 at 7:7-8:15, also ordering the Special Master to provide a detailed progress  
19 report on the District’s implementation of the section of the USP governing discipline.

20 G. Desegregation Impact Analysis (DIAs) and Notice and Request for Approval  
21 (NARA) procedures

22 1. Dietz Portables

23 In connection with the NARA procedures described in the Order Appointing  
24 Special Master (Doc. 1350) for attendance boundary changes, the sale or purchase of  
25 District property and other changes or projects that affect student assignment, the USP  
26 requires that the District “submit with each [NARA], a Desegregation Impact Analysis,  
27 (“DIA”), that will assess the impact of the requested action on the District’s obligation to  
28 desegregate and *shall specifically address how the proposed change will impact the  
District’s obligations under this Order.*” (USP Section X, C, 2; emphasis added)

In April 2015, the District’s Governing Board, without any consultation with the  
Plaintiffs or Special Master, approved a proposal to add portable classrooms to Dietz K-8,  
and, two weeks later, submitted that proposal to the Plaintiffs and Special Master under the  
NARA procedures for review and comment. (Order dated 6/12/15 (“Dietz Order”), Doc.  
1809, at 5:19-25.) In the Dietz Order that followed, the Court addressed the ongoing issue

1 with the District taking actions subject to the NARA process before consulting with the  
2 Plaintiffs and Special Master as required by the USP and Order appointing Special Master  
3 as follows:

4 In both this proposal and the Fruchthendler-Sabino Honors  
5 program proposal, ‘the Board [did] not have the benefit of any  
6 perspective that the plaintiffs and the Special Master might  
7 offer’... When the Board acts without considering input from  
8 the Plaintiffs and the Special Master, especially if it acts even  
9 before the preparation of the DIA, the Board has not acted  
10 consistently with the USP requirement that it consider the  
11 impact of its proposals in respect to its obligations under the  
12 USP... The Board is at a disadvantage if it must assess and  
13 commit to a project prior to preparation of the DIA. After-the-  
14 fact preparation of the DIA delays meaningful discussions and  
15 is contrary to the usual expedited nature of NARAs.

16 *Id.* at 4:23-5:5; 6:13-16. To address this issue, the Court therefore ordered that the “District  
17 shall prepare a DIA and allow a one-week turn around review and comment period and for  
18 *both the DIA and comments to be presented to the Board when it is assessing whether or*  
19 *not to approve a proposal governed by NARA provisions.” (Id. at 6:22-25; emphasis*  
20 *added.)*

## 21 2. Sale of Bonanza Property and Davis Parking Lot

22 Notwithstanding the Court’s clear directive concerning NARA review and comment  
23 procedures and the need for both the DIA and those comments to be provided to the Board  
24 “when it is assessing whether or not to approve a [NARA] proposal,” on June 13, 2017, the  
25 TUSD Board approved the sale of the Bonanza lot without having complied with review  
26 and comment procedures under the USP and Order Appointing Special Master or the  
27 Court’s Dietz Order, and apparently without having presented its Board with Plaintiff and  
28 Special Master comment or a DIA. (*See*  
<http://govboard.tusd1.org/Portals/TUSD1/GovBoard/docs/actions/06-13-17R.pdf> (item 3,  
1).) Indeed, it was not until August 9, 2017, almost two months after its Board approved the

1 sale, that the District provided the Plaintiffs and Special Master with a DIA addressing the  
2 approved proposal's impact on TUSD desegregation efforts. (*See* M. Taylor August 9,  
3 2017 email, attached as Exhibit 2.)

4 Separately, on April 4, 2017, the District's Governing Board approved entering an  
5 agreement for the sale of the Davis parking lot, also having apparently done so without the  
6 preparation of a DIA, delivery of such DIA to the Plaintiffs and Special Master for review  
7 and comment, and without those items having been delivered to the Board at the time it  
8 considered approving and did approve the sale. (*See*  
9 <http://govboard.tusd1.org/Portals/TUSD1/GovBoard/docs/actions/04-04-17R.pdf> (item 9,  
10 i).) With respect to the Davis parking lot, it was not until July 14, 2017, three months after  
11 the Board approved the proposed sale, that the District provided the Plaintiffs and Special  
12 Master with a DIA addressing the impact of the proposed sale on the District's  
13 desegregation efforts. (*See* S. Brown July 14, 2017 email, attached as Exhibit 3.) (Notably,  
14 the District's cover email transmitting the DIA noted that the proposal would again go  
15 before the Board for "final approval," reflecting what appears to be an understanding that  
16 the approval that already had been obtained involved a procedure that conflicts with the  
17 Court's Dietz Order (*see id.*), and a procedure to which both the Special Master and  
18 Mendoza Plaintiffs objected (*see* Special Master's July 17, 2017 email and J. Rodriguez  
19 July 18, 2017 email, attached as Exhibits 4 and 5, respectively).)

#### 20 H. Access to Needed Information

21 As the Court is aware, the Plaintiffs and the Special Master have repeatedly  
22 objected to the District's failure to provide in a timely fashion, or at all, information they  
23 needed to respond to the District's budget proposals, NARA requests, and proposed USP  
24 implementation action plans. This issue has been addressed by the Court on multiple  
25 occasions, particularly when the District moved to strike the following statement in the  
26 Special Master's 2014 Annual Report: "The continuing problem of the inability of the  
27 District to provide Plaintiffs and the Special Master with information they believe they  
28

1 need to exercise their roles as specified in the USP in a timely and effective way was noted  
2 above.” (Doc. 1641-1 at 7.) The Court denied the motion, stating: “The Court finds the  
3 record accurate as reflected in the Special Master’s report and Mendoza Plaintiffs’  
4 memorandum (Response (Doc. 1680) at [2-7]).”

5 Even after the Court ruled, the Plaintiffs and the Special Master continued to  
6 encounter difficulties obtaining needed information in a timely fashion. Thus, in his R&R  
7 on last year’s budget, the Special Master wrote: “The Special Master believes that there  
8 are no significant problems with the budget process agreed to by the parties. The problem  
9 is that the District did not comply with the process established and did not adequately  
10 provide information requested by the plaintiffs and the Special Master.” (Doc. 1954 at  
11 3:9-12; filed 8/22/16.) Thereafter, this Court rejected the District’s suggestion that no  
12 order was needed on the budget process. Instead, it set forth specific components to be  
13 included in the process, including a requirement that the District file a notice of  
14 compliance within five days of each benchmark deadline in the budget process. (Doc.  
15 1981 at 2:12-3:4 and 10:10-20.)

16  
17 **CONCLUSION**

18 None of the foregoing bespeaks a District that to date has demonstrated “an  
19 affirmative commitment to comply in good faith with the entirety of a desegregation plan”.  
20 (*Freeman*, 503 U. S. at 499.) Rather, it evidences a District that, going forward, must  
21 demonstrate that commitment.

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Dated: October 31, 2017

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on I electronically submitted the foregoing MENDOZA PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH UNITARY STATUS PLAN BY TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 [ECF 2075 – ECF 2075-10] to the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants:

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