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6	UNITED STATES DI	STRICT COURT
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8	DISTRICT OF	ARIZUNA
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Roy and Josie Fisher, et al., Plaintiffs, and Maria Mendoza, et al., Plaintiffs, V. Tucson Unified School District No. One, et al., Defendants.	Case No. 4:74-CV-00090-DCB MOTION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS FOR BAD FAITH & UNETHICAL MISCONDUCT BY DEFENDANT TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT #1 FOR IMPROPER FISHER CLASS MEMBER CONTACT AND INTEFERENCE (Assigned to Hon. David C. Bury) (Oral Argument Requested)
19 20 21	COMES NOW Plaintiffs Fisher Representative respectfully requesting that the District Court properties and the Court properties are the court properties.	erly sanction Defendant Tucson Unified School
22	District #1 (hereafter the "District") pursuant to the	e holding in Moser v. Bret Harte Union High
23	School District , 366 F.Supp. 2d. 944 (2005) [Dist	trict Court has inherent power to sanction bad
24	faith misconduct] for alleged egregious dishonesty/	bad faith and unethical misconduct through the
25	District's improper and surreptitious contact and	d subsequent interference with Fisher class
2627	members in a blatant attempt to both entice, throu	igh readily apparent conspiratorial subterfuge,

and purposely undermine the integrity of the present class action by inviting said class members

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to a clandestine meeting at the Viscount Hotel for an extravagant dinner with TUSD#1 Superintendent Trujillo held on January 31, 2020. The "dinner" was for the unconscionable purpose of improperly soliciting support for the District's claim that it had *already* done enough to warrant "Unitary Status" in the present case. Such misconduct was readily apparent through the District's purposeful presentation of misleading and biased information to said Class Members at the dinner in order to obfuscate the District's questionable progress under the consent decree itself. Moreover, the District's surreptitious presentation of misleading or biased information was actually in direct contravention of or adverse to the District Court's own factual findings in this case from earlier this year related to whether TUSD#1, or the District, should be given even "Partial Unitary Status", which issue is presently on appeal to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

Fisher Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions is supported by the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the separately filed Appendix of Exhibits, and the Court record.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION/MATERIAL FACTS

Recently, Fisher Plaintiffs have received and confirmed information from the Tucson African American Community concerning the fact that Defendant Tucson Unified School District (hereinafter "the District") had covertly and improperly contacted Fisher class members by secretly inviting certain hand-picked and uninformed members of said community to an exclusive or private dinner at the Tucson Viscount Hotel¹ on Thursday, January 30, 2020, at which dinner the TUSD #1 Superintendent, Dr. Trujillo, and a limited number of his staff, presented both

¹ In sharp contrast, the District significantly failed to invite or purposely excluded both the named *Fisher* Representatives and the *Fisher* Representatives' counsel, Rubin Salter, Jr., Esq., as well as other informed leaders of the African American Community such as the Director of the Tucson Urban League.

progress made under the Consent Decree actually supported the District's claims that a finding of "Unitary Status" was appropriate, and that the *Fisher* Plaintiffs had wrongfully opposed the District's most recent request for "Unitary Status".

Thus, the District, by and through the specific actions of its own Superintendent, had

misleading and biased information suggesting that statistical data collected to date related to

purposely not only improperly *contacted* specific members of the *Fisher* class, yet had also intentionally or purposely *interfered* with the adverse class itself. In essence, and as hereafter described, it is reasonably believed that the overarching intent of the District in having the exclusive Viscount Hotel dinner was to "pick-off" and/or improperly influence specific uninformed leaders of the African American Community in order to not only gain their support for the District's position that a finding of Unitary Status was warranted, yet to showcase vis a vis a misleading and biased power point presentation the District's "purported" good faith efforts to carry out the provisions of the Consent Decree itself, and to improperly suggest that the Tucson Unified School District had already successfully removed the vestiges of racial discrimination throughout the District to the extent practicable. Regrettably, the net effect of the District's improper contact and interference was to pit *Fisher* class members against each other.

Not surprisingly, the following information was thereafter conveyed by those in attendance to counsel for the *Fisher* Committee, and specifically by attorney Ms. Daisy M. Jenkins, Esq. (hereafter Dr. Daisy M. Jenkins)² relating to this highly questionable and surreptitious meeting between Defendant District and select members or leadership of the *Fisher* class of African American families and students:

² See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Daisy M Jenkins, Esq.

1)	That on January 29, 2020 Defendant Tucson Unified School District invited Dr. Daisy M. Jenkins to come to an invitation only dinner meeting featuring Dr. Gabriel Trujillo at the
2	Viscount Hotel on January 30, 2020 (See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit A,
3	Affidavit of Daisy M Jenkins, Esq. at p. 3);
42)	That the invitation Dr. Jenkins received was through an e-mail she had personally received from
5	Ms. Christina Chapa of African American Student Services (Id. at p. 3);
6 ³⁾	That Dr. Jenkins reasonably believed that the meeting would focus on African American Student Services, plus provide a plan to address ongoing issues of African American student academic
7	performance, along with other related issues, such as inequities in student discipline which have
8	regrettably included the disparate treatment and discipline of African American students (<i>Id.</i> at p. 3);
9 10 ⁴)	That the attendees of the 1/30/20 Viscount Hotel meeting with Dr. Trujillo and members of his staff interestingly included African American representation from the following groups:
11 a.	The NAACP
12 _b .	The Tucson Chapter of the Buffalo Soldiers
13°.	The "Prince Hall Masons of Tucson - Pima Lodge No. 10"
a. 14e.	A Local Barber Shop The Barbea Williams Performing Arts Company;
15 f	I Am You 360
8.	TEEM—Tucson Educational Empowerment for Minorities
16h. 17	Rising Star Baptist Church Several African American Student Service Employees and other TUSD staff members
18	(See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Daisy M Jenkins, Esq. at p 4);
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205)	That Dr. Jenkins was absolutely disturbed that the meeting actually centered around Dr. Trujillo and two (2) of his staff members, a statistician, and the woman that heads up Advanced Learning
21	Programs, trying to put a positive spin on data that highlighted academic performance issues for
22	African American students (<i>Id.</i> at p. 3);
236)	That in spite of the abysmal data presented at the invitation only meeting (which meeting, once
24	again, did <u>not</u> include either the named Fisher Committee, nor the Fisher Plaintiffs' attorney
25	Rubin Salter, Jr., Esq.), Dr. Trujillo tried to convince the audience, including Dr. Jenkins, that African American students were on an upward trend in their academic performance
26	notwithstanding substantial evidence actually presented at the meeting to contrary (<i>See Fisher</i> Plaintiffs' attached Exhibit A, Affidavit of Daisy M Jenkins, Esq. at p. 4 and <i>attached</i> Copy of
27	TUSD "Data" Presented at 1/30/20 TUSD Invitation Only Dinner with Local African American
28	Leadership);

1 2	7)	That by way of example of Dr. Trujillo's unsupported arguments concerning an alleged upward academic performance trend for African American students, Dr. Trujillo actually compared a 10% improvement in one area for African American students as better than analogous improvements made by the students of University High School (hereafter "UHS") (<i>See Fisher</i>
3		Plaintiffs' attached Exhibit A, Affidavit of Daisy M Jenkins, Esq. at p. 4);
4 ₈ 5	3)	That Dr. Jenkins noted such a comparison was in reality an absurd comparison based on the fact that UHS academic performance is at a much higher level than the alleged African American student improvement (<i>Id.</i> at p. 4);
79))	That a summary of the data presented showed the following:
8 _a	1.	African American students are still performing poorly in AZ Merit testing in <u>all</u> areas, especially in Math;
10 _է). 	African American students still experience suspensions and harsher discipline than other racial or ethnic groups; and
120		African American students are still severely underrepresented in Advanced Learning Programs.
13 14		(See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Daisy M Jenkins, Esq. at p. 4, with attached Copy of TUSD "Data" Presented at 1/30/20 TUSD Invitation Only Dinner with
15		Local African American Leadership);
161 17	0)	That it is noteworthy that when the presenter showed a graph with a straight or flat line at the bottom related to African American participation in such Advanced Learning Programs (with
18		other racial groups trending upwards) that despite the presenter's best efforts she could not paint any positive picture whatsoever, whereby Dr. Jenkins actually commented that our African American students were being flat-lined in said programs, and were actually on "life support" ³
1920	(Id. at p. 4, with attached Copy of TUSD "Data" Presented at 1/30/20 TUSD Invitation Onl	
21 ₁ 22	1)	That sadly, Dr. Jenkins noted that most of the select invitees appeared to be overwhelmed by the statistical presentation, and were not necessarily fully understanding the presentation as
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24		³ It should be specifically noted that from the School Year 2017-18 counsel was able to
25		extrapolate or confirm Dr. Jenkin's astute observations concerning the status of African American Students being flat-lined or on "life support" related to the Advanced Learning Programs or
26		"ALP's". In sharp contrast, an analysis of the available data definitely shows that while 56% of the students in self-contained GATE are Latino, and 40% are white, the percentage of African
27	American students is quite dismal as it is actually less than 1% (actually it is <u>.007 or 7/100</u> 0 <u>1%)</u> . It is highly questionable given such actually existing data how the District or TUS	American students is quite dismal as it is actually less than 1% (actually it is .007 or 7/1000 of
28		vestiges of discrimination to the extent practicable.

1	evidenced by their asking little to no questions during or after the presentation (<i>See Fisher</i> Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Daisy M Jenkins, Esq. at p. 4);
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3	2) That Dr. Jenkins repeatedly voiced her concerns that attention should be paid by TUSD to the real educational discrimination related issues, and challenged the notion of Dr. Trujillo and his
4	team trying to paint a rosy or positive picture of the data presented, which attempt actually spoke volumes about the ongoing need for the right or more appropriate interventions within the
5	District with regard to African American Student membership (<i>Id.</i> at p. 4);
6 1	3) That Dr. Jenkins further addressed Dr. Trujillo, telling him that he needed to fix these recurring
7	problems and that he cannot expect African American Student Services to address the issues of
8	systematic and systemic racism in the District without fixing said recurring problems (<i>Id.</i> at p. 4);
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10	4) That Dr. Jenkins also appropriately advised Dr. Trujillo that he is not only required to lead the charge under the Federal Court approved and supervised consent decree as to making the
11	required changes to remedy the disparate treatment of African American students in TUSD, yet
12	that the discussed meeting did <u>not</u> show in any way that he was committed to actually fulfilling this task (<i>Id.</i> at p. 4);
13	5\That are and the Da Tari'll 2 are are to Da Latin are the constant to the constant to the
14	5) That regrettably, Dr. Trujillo's response to Dr. Jenkins was the same as he has responded to her concerns in the past as to the ongoing disparate treatment of African American students in TUSD
15	#1 (ie. that he was merely going to push for Implicit Bias Training, which by itself is a meager response to the cancerous situation that presently exists for African American students within the
16	District) (See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Daisy M Jenkins,
17	Esq. at p. 4); and
181	6) That the meeting was both quite disappointing and insulting to Dr. Jenkins in that that Dr. Trujillo and TUSD would come to an apparently hand-picked audience of select local
19	African American Community Leadership touting progress in the area of African American
20	student performance, when the very data that was presented showed just the opposite. (<i>Id.</i> at p. 4, with <i>attached</i> Copy of TUSD "Data" Presented at 1/30/20 TUSD Invitation Only Dinner
21	with Local African American Leadership at pp. 40, 42, 44-45, 47).
22	It is further especially noteworthy that following receiving distressing reports from
23	members of the Fisher class or African American Community about the Viscount Hotel "dinner",
24	including the detailed report of Dr. Daisy M. Jenkins, Plaintiffs Fishers' counsel personally and
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26	promptly contacted the District or Dr. Trujillo to inquire about the TUSD "dinner" as well as the

alleged improprieties related thereto, which inquiry included a specific question about the source

of funding for the "dinner" and whether or not it had been improperly paid for with Desegregation

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1	funds, specifically inquiring by detailed e-mail ⁴ as follows:
2	"Dr. Trujillo please add these additional agenda items for the meeting which will be held
3	on February 26, 2020 at 1:30PM
4	1. Please provide the following information for our 2-26-2020 meeting regarding the dinner that TUSD African American Student Services Department hosted at the Viscount Suites Hotel on 1-
5	30-2020 for 50 select members of the African American Community.
6a b 7 _c	Places provide a list of the select members who were invited
8	2. Copies of any materials that were given to invitee's.
9	3. Did any TUSD officials lobby for support of the re-opening of Wakefield Middle School, if so, who and why did he or she
11	support re-opening?
12 13	4. Did TUSD officials ask attendees to rally behind TUSD and against the plaintiffs. Did they seek their support of District
	position on Unitary Status.
1415	5. Did Superintendent Trujillo recite misleading facts to the attendee's for example?
16 _a	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
17 b 18¢	English [with] only 34% whites minimally proficient in English, and 63% of 2,933 in math. Graduation rates for 2018-19 was 76.53% the lowest of any other racial group. Black students are disciplined at 3.5 times as whites.
19 _e	Loss than 20% of University High Cahaalia block
20	
21	6. How much did the dinner cost and if paid for by TUSD, did the funds come from 910G budgeted funds.
22	7. Who authorized payment?
23	8. What happened to the African American task force? Why is it
24	still getting funds in Deseg Budget.
25	9. Explain in detail how the \$260,00[0] dollars was spent on the
26	4 C F 1 District A
27	⁴ See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit #B; E-mail from Atty. Salter dated 2/13/20)
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education of TUSD's black student.

- a. Who authorized expenditures?
- b. What schools or programs the money was spent on?
- c. What sources, means and result were tracked and reported or codified in positive results.
 - 10. How did you judge the response of this select group?
- 11. Was there a dinner for select attendee's of the Mexican Communities and Native American Communities?

Regards,

Rubin Salter, Jr."

(See Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit #B; Email from Fisher Plaintiffs' Attorney Rubin Salter, Jr., Esq., dated 2/13/20)

Not surprisingly, a copy of Defendant TUSD#1's Purchase Order to pay for the exclusive Viscount Hotel dinner held on 1/30/20 was also subsequently received by the *Fisher* Plaintiffs⁵, firmly establishing that the dinner was a "Superintendent's Event that was apparently being paid for by the African American Student Services or Desegregation Funds. *See* Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit #C; TUSD#1 Purchase Order for Exclusive Viscount Hotel Dinner, No. 12010614, dated 1/21/20.

Subsequent and successive emails sent by/received from Dr. Trujillo on 2/15/20 and 2/19/20 in response to *Fisher* Plaintiffs' counsel's 2/13/20 e-mail inquiries may be revelatory as to Defendant's underlying motivations or "bad faith" in improperly contacting and interfering with *Fisher* Plaintiff Class Members as neither the District nor its Superintendent actually denied *any* of the alleged improprieties or concerns raised by the *Fisher* Committee's counsel of record⁶ related to their improper contact and interference with selected *Fisher* class members. In said e-

⁵ See Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit #C; TUSD#1 Purchase Order for Exclusive Viscount Hotel Dinner, No. 12010614, dated 1/21/20.

⁶ See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit #D; E-mails from Dr. Trujillo dated 2/15/20 and 2/19/20.

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yet in fact substantially communicated Superintendent Trujillo's obvious dismay at not only being "caught in the act with his hand in the Cookie Jar" as to not only improperly contacting the Fisher class members in the first place, yet for being specifically called out by Plaintiffs' counsel of record as to the District's egregious conduct in blatantly attempting to interfere with and improperly influence said class members. See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit #D, E-mails from Dr. Gabriel Trujillo dated 2/15/20 and 2/19/20. As the result, Dr. Trujillo remarkably, yet sadly, responded to Fisher Plaintiffs' counsel in an e-mail dated 2/15/20 as follows:

mails, Dr. Trujillo neither denied that the 1/30/20 meeting had taken place, nor stated that the

suggested or alleged improprieties or bad faith misconduct related to said meeting were not true,

"Good afternoon,

I have provided you with the exact presentation that was shared with the community on January 30th. In reviewing the requested agenda items, I don't find them to be relevant to collaboratively discussing our USP implementation efforts or improving academic outcomes for African American students. The Fisher Plaintiff Representatives will receive an invitation to attend our next community update meeting.

Gabriel Trujillo, Ed.D. / Superintendent"

See Fisher Plaintiffs' attached Exhibit D, E-mails from Dr. Trujillo, dated 2/15/20 and 2/19/20.

Ironically, only four (4) days after the District #1 Superintendent or Dr. Trujillo unilaterally and conveniently made a determination that the Fisher Committee's counsel's poignant questions in his 2/13/20 e-mailed inquiry were *not* relevant to "continued collaboration" by the parties in advancing the Consent Decree as to attaining both desegregation and the ultimate goal of removing or eradicating the vestiges of racial discrimination in education in Tucson, the Superintendent abruptly and unilaterally *cancelled* the previously and long scheduled 3rd Quarter Collaborative Meeting that was to be held on 2/26/20⁷, without even the courtesy of sending an

⁷ See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit E, 1/21/20 E-mails confirming Third Quarter Collaborative Meeting Attendance on 2/26/20 by Fisher Plaintiffs Exhibit E, E-mails confirming 3rd Quarter Collaborative Meeting Attendance by

actual e-mail, yet with the following cryptic unilateral notice of cancellation:

"From: Trujillo, Gabriel, Gabriel. Trujillo@tusd1.org

To: Rubin Salter, Jr. rsjr3@aol.com"

"Subject: <u>Canceled:</u> Dr. Trujillo, TUSD Counsel and Deseg. Team, Fisher Counsel and Plaintiffs (3rd Quarter)"

See Fisher Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit E, E-mails from Dr. Trujillo, dated 2/15/20 and 2/19/20.

It is very important to note that the 2/26/20 Third Quarter Collaborative Meeting had been previously scheduled for nearly one month, or since 1/21/20, and attendance at said meeting by *Fisher* Plaintiffs had been already confirmed by both parties. *See Fisher* Plaintiffs' Appendix of Exhibits, Exhibit E, E-mails confirming 3rd Quarter Collaborative Meeting Attendance by *Fisher* Plaintiffs exchanged between Nicholas Roman (Assistant to Superintendent Trujillo) and *Fisher* Plaintiffs' attorney Rubin Salter, Jr., Esq.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

The United States District Court should sanction Defendant TUSD #1 for its backhanded effort as herein described in detail in contacting *Fisher* class members in order to unduly influence them to support the District's "Unitary Status" claim, and cause dissension within the class. *Supra*. Given that the present case involves the District Court monitored Consent Decree between the parties related to *Fisher* Plaintiff's constitutional right to an education free of racial discrimination, the District's improper contact and interference with the *Fisher* class members in this case may constitute a violation of constitutional magnitude, entitling *Fisher* Plaintiffs to both appropriate sanctions, including attorney's fees and costs, as well as to the issuing

Fisher Plaintiffs exchanged between Nicholas Roman (Assistant to Superintendent Trujillo) and Fisher Plaintiffs' attorney Rubin Salter, Jr., Esq.

a Cease and Desist Order.

While a District Court should generally issue sanctions under an applicable rule or statute if possible, it is not so limited, and may actually rely on its inherent powers to sanction bad faith misconduct. *Moser v. Bret Harte Union High School District*, 366 F.Supp. 2d. 944 (2005) [District Court has inherent power to sanction bad faith misconduct] *citing In re Akros Installation, Inc.*, 834 F.2d 1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1987). A sanction imposed under the Court's inherent power requires, however, a specific finding of bad faith. *Roadway Express v. Piper*, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S.Ct. 2455 (1980), *Primus Auto Fin. Services v. Batarse*, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997), *Yagman v. Republic Ins.*, 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1993). Moreover, sanctions for such "bad faith" misconduct may be imposed pursuant to the Court's inherent powers upon either an attorney *or a party* to a lawsuit. *Roadway Express*, 447 U.S. at 766, 100 S.Ct. 2455 (1980).

Significantly, "bad faith" is defined by *Black's Law Dictionary* as follows:

"Dishonesty of belief or purpose." "8

It is highly arguable for the purposes of the present bad faith analysis under *Moser v. Bret Harte Union High School District*, and *In re Akros Installation, Inc.*, *supra*, that intentional and improper contact and interference with a disparate class for the purpose of influencing them with incorrect, biased and categorically false information constitutes *prima facie* bad faith misconduct that must be remedied in an appropriate manner, such as with the imposition of sanctions (including attorney's fees and costs) and the Court's entering a "Cease and Desist" Order.

In addition to bad faith misconduct providing a basis for the imposition of sanctions under the District Court's inherent authority, Federal courts have also recognized that they derive

⁸ *Black's Law Dictionary*, 9th Edition at p. 159.

authority to fashion remedies in education related desegregation and racial discrimination cases from multiple sources, including the federal Court's broad and flexible equitable powers to remedy past wrongs in such cases. *Swann v.*

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed, 402 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1971).

Federal courts have also recognized their authority to impose remedial sanctions for *civil* contempt related to misconduct committed outside of the presence of the Court itself. *United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell*, 512 U.S. 821, 827-29 (1994).

In such "cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right[,] the task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution". *Swann*, 402 U.S. at 15-16. By doing so, federal Courts focus on three (3) factors when applying equitable principles in these cases. *Milliken v. Bradley*, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977).

First, "with an equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.

Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. "The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution." Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281.

"Second, the decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be <u>designed as</u>

nearly as possible to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have

occupied in the absence of such conduct." Id.

"Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution." However, if the authorities "fail in their affirmative obligations...judicial authority may be invoked." Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15). "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15. Equitable

remedies "must be tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged." *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 784 F.3d 1254, 1265 (9th Cir. 2015) *cert. denied* 136 S.Ct. 799 (2016). "Nevertheless, the district court has broad discretion in fashioning a remedy [and] is permitted to order 'relief that the Constitution would not of its own force initially require if such relief is necessary to remedy a constitutional violation." *Id. quoting Toussaint v. McCarthy*, 801 F.2d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, an equitable remedy may exceed the scope of a district court's power only if it is 'aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the constitution or does not flow from such a violation." *Id. quoting Milliken*, 433 U.S. at 282.

It is particularly noteworthy for the purposes of reviewing the District's bad faith misconduct in this case that in *Fisher v. Tucson Unified School District*, 652 F.3d 1131 (2011) the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals recognized as of primary importance to its decision in that matter that the lower Court's finding or conclusion included a finding that "the school district had *failed to act in good faith* compliance with its [constitutionally mandated] desegregation obligations which compliance was actually required under United States Supreme Court precedent. In reversing the District Court's determination that the TUSD#1 had attained "unitary" status the 9th Circuit found or held that continued supervision over the Consent Decree was still required by the District Court because "[t]he test to determine when unitary status has been achieved, and accordingly, when federal court oversight may end, is well-established" and included the following ultimate inquiry:

- "1) Whether the [constitutional violator] ha[s] complied in **good faith** with the desegregation decree since it was entered; and
 - 2) Whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent

practicable.9

Therefore, in this case the "District" or Tucson Unified School District was actually required under applicable United States Supreme Court authority to act in *good faith* in the first instance with regard to Consent Decree between the parties, whereby any failures to do so, or to actually purposely act in *bad faith* with regard to complying with the desegregation decree itself, may constitute a violation of constitutional magnitude, entitling Fisher Plaintiffs to not only sanctions, yet appropriate constitutional remedies as well under the referenced United States Supreme Court authority, including those cases involving racial discrimination and desegregation in education, such as *Swann* and *Milliken*, *supra*.

In the present case, Defendant TUSD #1 (or "the District"), by and through its own Superintendent Dr. Gabriel Trujillo, has committed acts involving bad faith misconduct, as well as being violative of the *Fisher* Plaintiffs' implicit constitutional rights memorialized under the consent decree itself.

First, the District, through its own Superintendent, wrongly contacted and interfered with Fisher Class Members in an effort to improperly influence them in favor of the District (and its purported Unitary Status claim) and to set the various uninformed Class Members against themselves, in an obvious effort to basically avoid having further Court supervision of the Consent Decree (by doing an end run around the legal and procedural requirements necessary to actually attain Unitary Status), through merely trying to convince the Fisher Class Members vis a vis a power point presentation at an elaborate dinner, that <u>dishonestly</u> used incorrect and biased information in said presentation to communicate that it had already accomplished such status by

⁹ Fisher v. Tucson Unified School District citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89 (1995) (alterations in the original).

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not only its purported good faith efforts under the decree, yet by purportedly removing the vestiges of the original racial discrimination. Supra. Such planned, surreptitious, coercive and purposely dishonest behavior requires that the District Court use its inherent powers to correct, admonish and prevent further bad faith conduct on the part of the District in the future. Under applicable legal authority in Moser v. Bret Harte Union High School District, and In re Akros Installation, Inc., supra, the District Court's use of its inherent power to sanction TUSD #1 by awarding attorney's fees and costs would not only be justified, yet arguably required, in order to not only properly administer the Consent Decree itself, yet to ensure its integrity for the future, by implicitly "drawing a line in the sand" for the District, firmly establishing that such a course of conduct shall not be tolerated.

Secondly, it is highly arguable the Superintendent's misconduct in contacting the Fisher Class Members and interfering with them by dishonestly trying to influence them in favor of the District's Unitary Status claim, and thus undermining the Consent Decree of the very parties to this case which required good faith efforts in carrying out its provisions meant to promote and ensure the constitutional rights of the *Fisher* class members, as well as the removal of the vestiges of the original racial discrimination to the extent practicable which had motivated the egregious educational segregation, actually was implicitly violative of Fisher Plaintiffs' constitutional rights as well, militating an appropriate constitutional remedy under federal law in Swann and Milliken, supra.

In applying the referenced *Milliken* three-factor analysis to the facts of this case, equitable principles would also require an appropriate remedy under applicable federal law given the following considerations.

First, considering the nature of the constitutional violation, or the District's improper contact and interference with the Fisher class members, an equitable remedy including both the

sanctioning of the District with the attorney's fees and costs related Fisher Plaintiffs' present motion, as well as the District Court's entry of a "Cease and Desist" Order would definitely be related to District's described misconduct as such remedies are proximately related to violation itself.

Secondly, such District Court order(s) providing for both an attorney fee/costs assessment against the District, as well as a Cease and Desist Order, would be remedial, as such an order would be implicitly designed, as nearly as possible, to restore the *Fisher* Plaintiffs or Class Members to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such misconduct.

Third, the District Court in this case, by devising such a remedy involving both appropriate sanctions and a Cease and Desist Order, would have taken into account the interests of local educational authorities or School District and its interests in managing its own affairs consistent with the Constitution and the Consent Decree of the parties, because since the educational authority (ie. TUSD#1) has essentially *failed* in its affirmative obligations under the decree and applicable law to continue to both work in *good faith* for its implementation and the removal of the vestiges of racial discrimination, the District Court's judicial authority may be invoked. *Milliken*, 433 U.S. at 281 (quoting *Swann*, 402 U.S. at 15). Given that the scope of a District Court's equitable powers to remedy such wrongs is broad under *Swann*, *supra*, and that the suggested equitable remedies or sanctions are properly "tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged" that is, to end or prevent the District's further contact and interference with *Fisher* class members by Court imposed sanction and order to cease and desist, *Melendres v. Arpaio*, *supra*, it would be appropriate for the District Court intervene at this juncture, to both end the District's misconduct and prevent similar misconduct in the future.

Moreover, should the District argue that the Constitution would not of its own force initially require such relief as that requested by the *Fisher* Plaintiffs, such remedies are nonetheless

appropriate and necessary to remedy the District's egregious constitutional violation in essentially attempting to subvert the *Fisher* Class Members to their will by the herein described wholly improper contact, interference and influence, using tactics which included both the misrepresentation of incorrect and biased information to attain the District's insidious ends." *Melendres v. Arpaio*, *supra*, *quoting Toussaint v. McCarthy*, *supra*.

Should the District Court believe that the requested sanctions and Cease and Desist Order may be expansive of its present authority, applicable federal law actually provides that an equitable remedy may *exceed* the scope of a district court's power if it is 'aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the constitution or does not flow from such a violation." *Milliken*, 433 U.S. at 282. In the present case, the District's improper contact and interference with *Fisher* class members must be eliminated, even if it may not be considered an actual constitutional violation, and the United States Supreme Court's decision in *Milliken* provides the authority for the District Court to step at this juncture and end all improper conduct by the District with respect to the *Fisher* class members. *Id.*

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant Tucson Unified School District #1, by and through its own Superintendent, Dr. Gabriel Trujillo, has egregiously and improperly contacted the *Fisher* class members for the bad faith or dishonest purpose of attempting to surreptitiously influence them to believe that full Unitary Status has already been accomplished by the District, and to undermine the *Fisher* class itself by coercing its membership to be at odds with itself based upon the same false or misleading presentation of incorrect or biased facts at an exclusive dinner at the Viscount Hotel on Thursday, January 30, 2020 that was ironically, yet improperly paid for by the District with desegregation funding.

Under applicable federal law in in Moser v. Bret Harte Union High School District, and

In re Akros Installation, Inc., supra, the District Court has the inherent power to sanction the District for such bad faith misconduct. Moreover, federal constitutional authority cited herein, especially United States Supreme Court authority in other school desegregation and racial discrimination cases such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed. and Milliken v. Bradley provide that the federal Court may impose appropriate remedies for constitutional violations in cases involving desegregation and racial discrimination, so long as they are: 1) related to the proscribed misconduct, 2) aimed at restoring the offended party to their original position had not the misconduct taken place, and 3) narrowly tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.

Therefore, given that the requested relief in Fisher Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions which herein requests attorney's fees, costs and, most importantly, that an appropriate Cease and Desist Order be entered against the District to prevent further improper contact and interference with Fisher class members, is within the District Court's inherent powers to grant under Moser v. Bret Harte Union High School District, and In re Akros Installation, Inc., supra, and that such sanctions are related to the District's bad faith misconduct, aimed at restoring Fisher Plaintiffs to their original position had such misconduct not taken place and narrowly tailored to remedy the specific conduct alleged, Plaintiffs' motion should be granted, whereby a Cease and Desist Order should issue forthwith to prevent further misconduct by the District, and both attorney's fees and costs related to the present motion should be awarded.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of March 2020.

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s Rubin Salter, Ir. RUBIN SALTER, JR., ESO. ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS FISHER

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on March 17, 2020, I electronically submitted the foregoing MOTION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS FOR BAD FAITH & UNETHICAL MISCONDUCT BY
3	DEFENDANT TUCSON UNIFIED DISTRICT #1 FOR IMPROPER FISHER CLASS MEMBER CONTACT AND INTERFERENCE to the Office of the Clerk of the United States
4	District Court for the District of Arizona for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECT registrants:
5	P. Bruce Converse
6	bconverse@dickinsonwright.com
7	Timothy W. Overton toverton@dickinsonwright.com
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